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This study analyzed the potential economic impacts of the FAIR Act under GATT and
NAFTA on the U.S. peanut industry.  Results indicate that the economic impacts of the new
program combined with the trade agreements are profound on the peanut industry in both short
and long terms.  Changes of the peanut program could decrease peanut producers’ farm income
substantially, eliminate government financial costs related to excessive quotas, and transfer peanut
growers’ program benefits back to peanut consumers.  Increasing imports of foreign peanuts due
to free/reduced trade barrier agreements would transfer peanut producers’ program benefits to
domestic peanut importers and foreign exporters who sell peanuts to the U.S. 
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Economic Implications of the FAIR Act on U.S. Peanut Producers
The long debate and discussion on the U.S. peanut program concluded when President
Clinton signed the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996.  The Act
symbolizes that the U.S. peanut industry is entering an era characterized as no government
financial support and increasing competition.  Under the new 7-year peanut program, Congress
reduced the quota support price, and eliminated the minimum poundage quota floor, the price
escalator, and undermarketing carryover.  U.S. Department of Agriculture, based on the Act and
anticipated domestic market demand, adjusted the annual basic quota poundage.  Accompanied by
the domestic policy reform, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with their transition mechanisms continue to open the
U.S. domestic market to foreign peanuts and peanut products.  Minimum import access levels for
1 
edible peanuts and peanut products under the trade agreements were 96,467 short tons (st.) in
1995 and would reach as high as 136,763 st. by year 2000 (Fletcher et al.).  Because of trade
agreements among member countries, the U.S. government has to reduce quota peanut
production to cope with increasing imports of foreign peanuts and peanut products. 
Domestic policy reform coupled with increasing imports has been reshaping the U.S. peanut
industry.  Many are convinced that peanut program reform may alter peanut growers’ livelihoods
since peanut production with a support price has been an economic backbone in many peanut
producing areas for more than five decades (Head; U.S. Congress).  Based on the 1992
Agricultural Census, seven states produced about 98% of U.S. peanuts.  In the seven states about
36% of the peanut producing counties had 35% or more of their total crop income from peanuts. 3
Twenty-four percent of the counties had 50% or more of their crop income from peanuts.  From a
state perspective, crop income from peanuts in the peanut producing counties amounted to about
48% in Virginia, 50% in Oklahoma, and 70% in Alabama.  Because of the high concentration of 
peanut production, changes in policy combined with increasing imports could create difficulty for
local rural communities to absorb the economic shock in the short time frame.  
The bulk of literature (Borges; Carley and Fletcher; Earley; Fleming and White; Nieuwoudt
et al.; Sanford and Evans; Song et al.; U.S. General Accounting Office) has examined various
parts of previous peanut programs.  Martin and Brown estimated economic impacts of support
price and quota reduction in North Carolina before the new program, but no studies known have
examined the reform of the new peanut program and its economic implications.  An understanding
of the program reform and increasing imports that affect different market participants related to
peanuts would be of particular interest to policy makers and peanut leaders.  The information and
knowledge of the new program and potential economic impacts are also important for peanut
growers to recognize and meet the challenges presented by the new program.
The objective of this analysis is to analyze the economic impacts of domestic peanut policy
reform associated with trade agreements on the U.S. peanut industry.  Specific objectives include
evaluating the economic impacts of domestic peanut program reform on peanut producers,
consumers, and government expenditures between 1996 and 1995 crops, estimating the impacts
of the new peanut program combined with GATT and NAFTA on program benefit redistributions
among U.S. peanut growers, peanut product manufacturers, and foreign peanut exporters
between the two years, and projecting the economic impacts of the new program and trade
agreements on the U.S. peanut industry for the 1997-2002 period.4
The U.S. Peanut Program and Its Recent Reform
The U.S. peanut program was one of several agricultural commodity programs established
by the Congress in the 1930s to subsidize farmers’ income and cope with economic instability of 
agriculture.  Before 1976, a system of fixed acreage allotments was used to control peanut
production.  A guaranteed government loan was introduced as the floor price to support peanut
producers who had allotments.  In the mid-1950s import restrictions were imposed to prevent
foreign competition.  A quota poundage system was introduced into the program in the 1977 farm
bill.  Under the system, peanuts were categorized into “quota” and “nonquota” (i.e., additional
peanuts).  Quota peanuts were often called “edible peanuts” or “edibles” and produced on the
allotments under quota limits, while additional peanuts (or additionals) were produced on allotted
acreage but beyond quota limits.  Edibles were used for domestic food consumption, while
additionals were exported or crushed for oil and meal.  Additional peanuts could be used for
domestic food consumption only through “buyback” in the case of shortage caused by natural
disasters such as serious drought and pest infestations.  Both edibles and additionals were
supported by the government, but the support price was two or three times higher for edibles than
for additionals.  The mandatory acreage allotment provision was no longer in force after 1981. 
Anyone could produce peanuts, but only those who had quota were guaranteed the higher
government support price for quota peanuts.
The U.S. peanut program essentially is an income transfer program from peanut consumers
to peanut producers through supply management.  The program theoretically should not create
government financial burdens if the supply of quota peanuts set by the government equals the
domestic demand for edible peanuts.  However, a surplus of quota peanuts often took place5
because predicting domestic demand was difficult for the government.  The “error” of
government annual quota establishment may be attributed to either policy consideration for
abundant high quality peanuts, changes in domestic food demand, or increasing peanut imports. 
Peanut growers could sell their quota peanuts to the government agency, Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC), if they were not able or willing to market their quota peanuts through
commercial channels.  All quota peanuts unused in the CCC must be crushed or exported within
the same year.  Any resulting losses between the support price paid (for quota peanuts) and
market price (for peanut oil and meal) received by the CCC pool were absorbed by the federal
government using tax revenues.  Government expenditures associated with previous peanut
programs averaged about $62 million annually in the 1970s, $14 million in the 1980s, and $50
million in fiscal years 1991 and 1992 (Sanford and Evans).  The Congressional Budget Office
November 1995 spending baseline projected outlays to average $63.5 million for the fiscal years 
1997-2002 if the program remained unchanged (Fletcher et al).
While the FAIR Act of 1996 retained the basic structure of the 1990 peanut program in
terms of program mechanisms such as quota and two-tiered support price systems, several major
changes were made in the new program.  The most important change brought by the FAIR Act is
that the government would no longer bear any financial costs resulting from excessive quota
peanut production.  All losses from crushed quota peanuts in the CCC pool would be paid by
peanut producers who participate in the program.  A second major change of the new program is
that the support price was reduced substantially.  Under the FAIR Act, the support price (i.e.,
loan rate) of quota peanuts was reduced from $678/ton in 1995 to $610/ton for the entire life of
the 7-year-long program (1996-2002), with no price escalator for production cost increases.  A6
possible rational behind this price adjustment is that lowering price may stimulate domestic
consumption of edible peanuts.  Third, the method of determining quota level was modified in the
new program.  Seed under the new program is treated as a temporary quota allocated to all
peanut growers.  The quota floor (1.35 million tons) in the previous program was eliminated since
it is believed that the quota floor resulted in overproduction of edible peanuts.  Basic quota
poundage for the 1996 crop was about 1.1 million tons, or 18.5% less than the quota poundage in
1995.  Additionally, undermarketings designed as a buffer for nondelivery of quota peanuts were
also eliminated.  Sales or leases of quota across county lines were restricted within the state. 
Those who do not produce peanuts or live outside the state are not eligible to own quotas. 
Fletcher et al discussed and summarized the changes of the new peanut program in more  detail.
Analytical Framework
The reform of the peanut program was driven by political pressure of increasing treasury
costs to the government in the recent years (Borges) and the overall political climate against 
supply management programs.  Increasing foreign competition due to GATT and NAFTA was
also a catalyst for changes in the peanut program.  While the peanut program is complicated in
terms of its many provisions and regulations, the essence of the program reform is simple--to
control quota peanut production, and in doing so to meet demand for edible peanuts in the
domestic food market.  Most provisions and regulations changed or modified such as quota floor,
temporary quota for seed, and undermarketings all come to quota poundage.  The feature of a
supply management program determines that the supply of U.S. quota peanuts is a single point, B,
in Figure 1 under the previous program.  Given the fixed support price, P , USDA sets the quota s07
level at Q  where the supply would presumably equal domestic demand for U.S. produced edible 1
peanuts.  The supply of all edible peanuts, Q  in Figure 1, includes U.S. quota  peanuts and 0
imported foreign edible peanuts.  The difference between Q - Q  is the import of foreign edible 0 1
peanuts, which is regulated by trade agreements.   
2
Domestic demand for peanuts consists of demand for edibles and demand for additionals. 
The demand for edible peanuts in the domestic food market includes demand for quota peanuts
and demand for imported edible peanuts.  Without NAFTA and the new GATT, imported peanuts
were not an issue because U.S. used Section 22 to prevent foreign peanuts coming into the
domestic market.  Under the new GATT, Section 22 was replaced with tariff rate quotas.  
Minimum import access level of peanuts to the U.S. domestic market was granted to member
countries of the trade agreements including Argentina, Mexico, and Canada.  
Referring to Figure 1, let curve D D  represent the aggregate demand for edible peanuts and  00
D *D * be the domestic demand for U.S. quota peanuts under the previous program.  With a 00
support price of P , the supply for quota peanuts under the previous program was set at Q  by the s0 1
government.  Because of increased imports due to GATT and NAFTA, U.S. peanut growers
would lose quota by Q  - Q  under the previous program, ceteris paribus. 01
Peanuts for export or crushing are not subject to supply management control.  The
aggregate farm-level demand for additionals is denoted by P D, which is a combined demand for at
export and crushed peanuts.  Additional peanuts include crushed and exported edibles through
CCC and contracted additionals through commercial channels.  The combined demand for
additionals is assumed to be perfectly price elastic since additionals and unused edibles for food
must be crushed or exported.  Furthermore, world demand for American peanuts and peanut8
products is a small component of the total world oilseed complex (Helmberger).  Therefore, total
aggregate farm-level demand for all edible and additional peanuts under the previous peanut
program can be captured by a kinked demand curve, D ND (Figure 1).  Aggregate demand for 0t
American peanuts at the farm-level under the previous program is reflected by a kinked demand
curve, D *RD.  0t
The demand schedule of edible peanuts associated with the previous program, D D , 00
however, shifted to D D  due to a shift in consumers’ preference such as away from foods viewed 11
as high in fat.  This is evident by the continued decline in peanut food use in the domestic market
since the 1989/90 peak.  After accounting for imports, the domestic demand for U.S. produced
edible peanuts would be D *D * (Figure 1).  If there was no change in the quota peanut support 11
price, domestic demand for U.S. quota peanuts could be Q .  The 1996 peanut program reduced 4
the support price of quota peanuts from P  to P , which would lead to an increase of demand for s0 s1
quota peanuts by Q  - Q .  U.S. Department of Agriculture reduced quota by Q  - Q , so that the 34 12
demand and supply for domestic produced edible peanuts under the FAIR Act would presumably
be equal.  Because of GATT and NAFTA, imported peanuts would be Q  - Q , which was larger 23
than Q  - Q  in 1995.  While imported peanuts do not create a financial burden associated with 01
quota peanuts for the government, they are  substitutes of domestic produced edible peanuts. 
Because of the lower price for imported peanuts, peanut product manufacturers would use them. 
The potential increase in surplus of domestic edible peanuts forces the government to reduce
quota peanuts to maintain a supply and demand balance with no government cost.  Due to GATT
and NAFTA, the U.S. government cannot reduce the imports that are the minimum access levels
as designated in the agreements.  Thus, the aggregate demand for all peanuts under the new9
peanut program is represented by the kinked curve D SD, while the demand for U.S. produced 1t
peanuts under the new peanut program is captured by D *TD. 1t
Changes in support price, quota, and imports affect the peanut industry, especially quota
peanut growers’ welfare.  A reduction of support price from  P  to P  at the new quota level s0 s1
would decrease farm income for quota peanut producers by P AG P , ceteris paribus (Figure 1).  s0 s1
A reduction of quota poundage from Q  to Q  would reduce farm income (i.e., gross income) for 12
quota producers by JBQ Q , other things constant.  The imports (Q  - Q ) would decrease farm 12 2 3
income for quota producers by GEQ Q , ceteris paribus (Figure 1). 23
Farm income reduced for quota growers is the gain for consumers and taxpayers since the
program benefits under the previous program were from consumers and taxpayers.  Changes in
the peanut program should result in an income transfer back to consumers by the area of P HGP s0 s1
(Figure 1).   Of the farm income reduction due to lowering quota, JBCK is the savings for
3
government expenditures and GEKF is the benefit captured by peanut importers.  Area AJEG
would be benefit lost for peanut importers due to the reduction of support price for edible
peanuts.  Area KFQ Q  is the benefit transferred to foreign peanut producers and exporters.   23
The fixed seven-year peanut program under the FAIR Act gives us an advantage to analyze
long term economic impacts.  Since minimum import access levels for foreign peanuts under
GATT and NAFTA are fixed for each individual year, impacts of the FAIR Act on the U.S.
peanut industry mainly depend on the domestic demand for edible peanuts because of the fixed
support price for the seven year period.  Long term impacts of domestic policy reform and
increasing imports due to GATT and NAFTA were analyzed based on three different hypothetical
scenarios about the possible changes in domestic demand for edible peanuts. Qi’$0%$1Pi%$2Ii%$3Si%gi
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Methods and Data
While a new support price and basic quota are given for 1996, the demand function for U.S.
produced edibles must be estimated to analyze the program effect on income transfer between
producers and consumers.  Total quota needs to be estimated because of changes in
provisions/regulations in the new program.  The price of additional peanuts also needs to be
obtained to estimate program effects on government expenditures and benefit transfer. 
Domestic demand for quota peanuts at the farm gate was specified as a function of price for
edible peanuts, personal disposable income, and the price of a substitute for peanuts.  Since there
was little variation in government loan rates over time, free on board (FOB) price of shipping
sales was derived as the price for domestic edible peanuts.  FOB price of cleaned shelled peanuts
was converted to the price of farmer stock peanuts using the formula established by the
International Trade Commission.   Cleaned shelled peanuts were also converted to farmer stock
4
peanuts.  The aggregate demand function for American produced edible peanuts was specified as:
(1)
where Q is quantity of demand for domestic edible peanuts (farmer stock peanuts, 1000 lbs.); P is
real FOB price for edible peanuts (cents/lb) (base year: 1982-84=100); I denotes real disposable
income for the U.S. (million dollars); S is real price of almond, a peanut substitute (cents/lb), and
g is random error for the equation.  
FOB price was a weighted average of the prices for medium Runners, medium Virginia,
No.1 Spanish, and Virginia fancy reported in Peanut Marketing Summary [U.S. Department of
Agriculture (a)].  Weight used for deriving the FOB price was quota peanut disappearance in the
domestic market each year including peanut butter, candy, salted peanuts, and roasting stocks. 11
Disposable income was collected from Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Department
of Commerce).  The price of almond was collected from Agricultural Statistics [U.S. Department
of Agriculture (b)].   The consumer price index was used to deflate the monetary value of FOB
price.  With this estimated equation, the demand for edibles under the current program at the
previous support price could be estimated by substituting the support price, P  in real terms, into s0
the demand function, holding disposable income and almond price at their means.  The potential
income transferred back to peanut consumers from quota growers was approximated with the
formula:  (P  -  P )(Q ) + ½(P  -  P )(Q - Q ) (Figure 1). s0 s1 4 s0 s1 3 4
Total quota for the 1996 crop under the new program consists of basic quota and temporary
quota for seed.  Given the basic quota determined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for
1996, the amount of additionals was derived using the relationship of quota to additional peanut
marketings in the previous three years.  Since peanuts are distinguished by type (i.e., Runner,
Virginia, Valencia, and Spanish), peanut production was further decomposed according to the
production distribution for each of these types of peanuts in the previous three years.   The
5
decomposition of peanuts by type is applicable since production distribution, yield per acre, and
seeding rate vary with type of peanut produced in each region.    Planted acreage equals
6
production divided by average yield per acre for the previous three years.   Temporary quota for
7
seed equals planted acreage multiplied by the seed rate for each type of peanut, respectively. 
Planted acreage for temporary quota equals temporary quota divided by average yield per acre for
the previous years.  Total quota is the sum of basic quota and temporary quota for seed. 
   To estimate the program effect on government expenditures, the price of additional peanuts
was also derived.  The price of additional peanuts, P , was a weighted average price of export and a12
crushed peanuts in the CCC pool and contracted additionals through the commercial channel
[U.S. Department of Agriculture (d)].  Based on the information for the 1992-1994 period, the
derived weighted average price for additional peanuts was $349.80 per ton.  The price of
imported foreign peanuts is assumed to equal the price of exported peanuts due to no price
information available for imported peanuts.
Long term  impacts of the FAIR Act associated with GATT and NAFTA were
approximated.  Since the new peanut program is a no-net-cost program, there would be no cost
due to quota for government expenditures for 1996 and beyond because the CCC would use pool
profits and, if necessary, grower assessments to cover the costs relative to quota crushed.  Long
term economic impacts of domestic peanut policy reform and trade on the U.S. peanut industry
were derived from changes in the quota level and imported peanuts and peanut products for edible
peanuts.  The minimum import access levels under GATT and NAFTA are assumed to be fully
imported given the price difference between domestic produced quota peanuts and imported
foreign peanuts.   The demand for U.S. quota peanuts was treated as a constant since the quota
8
released by U.S. Department of Agriculture was 3% higher in 1997 than in 1996 [U.S.
Department of Agriculture (c)].  For the 1998-2002 period, three hypothetical situations were
assumed for the domestic edible peanut demand:  constant, increase by 3% annually, and decrease
by 3% annually.
Economic Implications
The aggregate demand for American produced edible peanuts (equation 1) was estimated
and is summarized in Table 1.  The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was used to correct for13
autocorrelated errors (Shazam).  All parameters estimated are as theoretically hypothesized.  An 
increase in the edible peanut price decreases the demand for edible peanuts, ceteris paribus.  An
increase in personal disposable income increases the demand for edible peanuts.  An increase in
almond price increases the demand for edible peanuts.  The price elasticity of domestic demand, at
the mean, for edible peanuts is -0.14, which implies that a 1% decrease in edible peanut price
results in about a 0.14% increase in edible peanut demand, holding other factors constant.  
Total quota and planted acreage for the 1996 crop year were estimated and are reported in
Table 2.  Based on the information released by U.S. Department of Agriculture, domestic demand
for quota peanuts was set at 1.1 million tons or 81.48% of the 1995 basic quota for 1996.  Given
this basic quota level, about 994 million pounds of additional peanuts would be produced for the
1996 crop year (Table 2).  Taking into consideration the differences in seed rates, yield, and
production distribution for the different types of peanuts, U.S. peanut growers would plant 1,462
thousand acres and produce about 2,388 million lbs. of quota peanuts.  Of this total quota, about
195 million lbs. of peanuts (i.e., 8%) were temporary quota for seed.  Reduction of quota and
elimination of undermarketings due to the new program would result in about 573 million lbs. or a
19% decline in total quota in 1996 relative to 1995 total quota level.  Planted acreage would drop
about 77 thousand acres or by 5% between 1996 and 1995 (Table 2).  Imports of foreign peanuts
brought by GATT and NAFTA would increase by 16 million pounds between the two crop years.
Reductions in quota and support price levels associated with other modified and/or
eliminated provisions affect market participants related to peanuts.  Quota and support price
reduction due to the new peanut program combined with GATT and NAFTA would result in a
decline of $277 million in farm income for quota growers, which was about 26% lower in 199614
than in 1995 (Table 2).  Of the decline in farm income, about $81 million were attributable to the
support price reduction and $198 million were due to quota reduction.  Imports of foreign
peanuts increased by 8% between the two years, but farm income would increase by 3% because
the support price under FAIR Act was about 10% lower than that under the previous peanut
program.
Farm income reduced due to the new program was the saving for the federal government
and income transfer to peanut consumers.  Changes in the program would eliminate the financial
burden caused by excessive quota for taxpayers, which could be about $94 million in the 1996
crop year, other things constant.  Under the new program, about $80 million of farm income
would be transferred back to peanut consumers from quota peanut growers through the reduction
of support price for quota peanuts.   
9
Since imported peanuts and peanut products replace domestic edible peanuts and peanut
products, about 209 million lbs. of quota peanuts (farmer stock peanuts) were squeezed out of the
domestic food market in 1996 (Table 2).  This means that increased imports for foreign peanuts
and peanut products resulted in gross farm income reduction by $64 million.  Of the income
reduction due to GATT and NAFTA, about $27 million were transferred to peanut product
manufacturers and $37 million were transferred to foreign peanut producers in 1996, ceteris
paribus.
Long term economic impacts of the FAIR Act associated with GATT and NAFTA over the
next six years were estimated and are summarized in Table 3.  If there was no change in domestic
demand for U.S. produced edible peanuts since 1997 (Scenario 1), American peanut producers’
farm income would increase by $2 million for the 1997-2002 period compared with the 1996 crop15
because of the difference between two support prices, other things constant.  If there was a 3%
increase in domestic demand for American produced edible peanuts (Scenario 2), U.S. peanut
growers would gain about $141 million in farm income over its base even though imports of
foreign peanuts increase.  If domestic demand for American produced edible peanuts declined by
3% (Scenario 3), there would be about $84 million of farm income reduction for American peanut
producers, ceteris paribus.
Summary and Conclusions
While the debate and discussion on the U.S. farm program are over, the FAIR Act coupled
with increasing international trade has been changing the U.S. peanut industry.  This study
examined historical peanut programs and analyzed how FAIR Act affected the U.S. peanut
industry under GATT and NAFTA.  Results show that domestic policy reform combined with
increasing peanut imports would have profound economic impacts on quota peanut growers,
government expenditures, and peanut consumers.  Increasing imports of foreign peanuts brought
by GATT and NAFTA would transfer U.S. peanut producers’ program benefits to domestic
peanut importers, peanut product manufacturers, and foreign peanut growers who sell peanuts to
this country. 
Findings suggest that the FAIR Act with free and reduced trade barrier agreements have
been reshaping the U.S. peanut industry.  The peanut program is moving the American peanut
industry toward a new arena characterized as a more open, less policy intervention, and more
competitive market environment.  The peanut industry may be better off in the long run because
less policy distortion combined with free trade would improve production and economic16
efficiencies.  Domestic policy reform, however, would create economic difficulties for the industry
in the next several years.  The drastic decline in farm income for peanut growers raises concerns
about peanut growers’ survival in those highly concentrated peanut production regions.  These
changes would also present challenges to those who heavily depend on peanuts such as shellers. 
Given an increasing import for foreign peanuts and a sluggish domestic demand for U.S. produced
edible peanuts, a further decline could be expected for quota peanut production.  A contraction of
economic activities in rural communities and in the peanut shelling industry may be inevitable.  It
would be also challenging for peanut growers to adjust their production and marketing methods
to meet the changing domestic program. 17
Endnotes
 U.S. peanut exports have not been expanded as expected since the initiation of NAFTA and the
1
new GATT.  Export of U.S. peanuts was, in shelled basis, about 337,000 mt. in 1989/90, 195,000
mt. in 1990/91, 335,000 mt. in 1992/93, and 170,000 mt. in 1993/94 (Man-Producten Rotterdam
B.).  Preliminary estimate for U.S. peanut exports was about 285,000 mt. in 1994/95.  Forecasted
U.S. peanut export was about 240,000 mt. in 1995/96.  
 Peanuts entering the U.S. is not only determined by market forces but also by the regulations of
2
GATT and NAFTA.  This simplification enables us to treat imported peanuts as predetermined
component of edible peanuts in total U.S. demand. 
 Previous work by Zhang, et al and Fletcher and Deodhar have shown that only a part of the
3
transfer ultimately reaches the final consumers.
 The formula used to convert shelled peanuts to farmer stock peanuts is Q  = Q  ×
4
FST shelled
(1/R ) × (1/R ), where Q  represents farmer stock peanuts (lbs.), Q  represents shelled shelling culling FST shelled
peanuts (lbs.), R  is shelling rate (75%), and R  is culling rate (88%).   The formula used to shelling culling
convert the price of shelled peanuts to the price of farmer stock peanuts is  P  = P  × R FST shelled shelling
× R  - C , where P  denotes the price of farmer stock peanuts (¢/lbs.), P  denotes the culling shelling FST shelled
price of shelled peanuts (¢/lbs.), and C  denotes shelling cost (9.98 cents/lb.).  shelling18
 During the 1992-94 period, Runner peanut production accounted for 74.22%, Virginia 18.26%,
5
Valencia 1.70%, and Spanish 5.82% of the total U.S. peanut production, respectively [U.S.
Department of Agriculture (c)].
 Per acre farmers stock peanuts seed usages vary with type of peanuts.  Based on the criteria of
6
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Runner peanuts require 145 lbs/acre, Virginia 165 lbs/acre,
Valencia 120 lbs/acre, and Spanish 120 lbs/acre, respectively [U.S. Department of Agriculture
(c)].  
 Yield per acre varies with type of peanuts.  During the 1992-94 period, yield per acre averaged
7
about 2,404 lbs. for Runner, 2,330 lbs. for Virginia, 2,521 lbs. for Valencia, and 1,538 for Spanish
peanuts, respectively [U.S. Department of Agriculture (c)]. 
 Under GATT, minimum import access level of foreign peanuts to the U.S. domestic market was
8
about 96,467 st. in 1995 and 104,515 st. in 1996, and would be about 112,569 st. in 1997,
120,693 st. in 1998, 128,693 st. in 1999, 136,763 st. in 2000, 136,965 st. in 2001, and 137,174 
st. in 2002 in farmer stock peanuts (Fletcher et al).
 See endnote 3.
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Table 1.  Estimated Domestic Demand for Edible Peanuts (1965-94)
Indep. Variable Estimated Coef. t-ratio Elasticity at Means
Intercept 1,081,800.00 3.722* 0.515
Edible peanut price (P) -5,170.20 -7.158* -0.144
Income (I) 0.47 4.202* 0.541
Almond price (S) 963.70 2.932* 0.061
R  = 0.95
2
* Indicates significance at P< 0.01.22
Table 2.  Economic Implications of the FAIR Act under GATT and NAFTA
1995 1996 Crop Difference (1996-95)
Item Unit Crop Projection Quantity %
Quota thou. lbs 2,691,621 2,193,173 -498,448 -18.52
a
Effective Quota thou. lbs 2,961,621
b
Additionals thou. lbs 994,165
Planted Acreage thou. acre 1,539 1,376 -163 -10.60
Temporary Quota for Seed thou. lbs 195,136
Planted Acreage for Seed Quota thou. acre 86
Total Quota thou. lbs 2,961,621 2,388,309 -573,312 -19.36
Total Planted Acreage thou. acre 1,539 1,462 -77 -5.00
Imports due to GATT & NAFTA thou. lbs 192,934 209,030 16,096 8.34
c
Gross Income thou. dol 1,069,394 792,188 -277,206 -25.92
d
    (1) Due to Price Reduction thou. dol -81,202
e
    (2) Due to Quota Reduction thou. dol -197,654
f
    (3) Due to increasing imports thou. dol 65,405 63,754 1,650
g
Government Expenditures thou. dol -94,080
h
Income Transfer to Consumers thou. dol 79,770
i
Benefit Transfer due to Peanut Imports:
    (1) To Importers and Manu. thou. dol 31,660 27,195
j
    (2) To Foreign Peanut Producers thou. dol 33,744 36,559
k
Referring to Figure 1,   basic quota in 1996 = basic quota in 1995 × quota reduction rate under the new
a
program (i.e., 18.52%).    Effective quota = basic quota + undermarketings.    Minimum import access level
b c
set by GATT and NAFTA for 1995 (Q  - Q ) and 1996 (Q  - Q ), respectively, where Q  = quantity of  01 23 0
demand for all peanuts in 1995, Q  = total quota peanuts in 1995, Q  = quantity of demand for all peanuts in 12
1996, and Q  = total quota peanuts in 1996.    P AG P  + JBQ Q  + (GEQ Q   - BLQ Q ).    P AG P  = 3 s os 1 1 2 2 3 0 1s os 1
de
(P  - P )× Q , where P  = $678/ton and  P  = $610/ton.   JBQ Q =  P  × (Q  - Q ).    Minimum import so s1 3 s0 s1 1 2 so 1 2
fg
access level × support price of quota peanuts for 1995 (P ) and 1996 (P ), respectively.    JBCK =  (P  - P )  so s1 so a
h
×  (Q  - Q ), where P  = weighted average price of additional peanuts for 1992-94 ($349.8/ton).   P HG P  =  12 a so s1
i
(P  - P ) ×  Q  + ½(Q  - Q ) × (P  - P ), where Q  = quantity of the derived demand for quota peanuts under so s1 4 3 4 so s1 4
the previous support price based on estimated demand function.   Minimum import access level ×  (P  - P )
j
s1 a
for 1995 and 1996, respectively.    Minimum import access level ×  P  for 1995 and 1996, respectively.
k
a